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Creation, Procreation and the Gift. of L. fe
Richard Sherlock

This essay arises out of a concern with a certain noticeable
trend in current discussions of
proposals to limit population. The
vast majority of the proposals and
material that I have studied are
concerned essentially with the
elimination of procreation for
either the whole of mankind or

Mr. Sherlock holds an M.T.S.
degree from the Harvard Divinity
School and is presently in the
third year of a Ph.D. program in
R eligious Ethics at Harvard. His
article challenges the utilitarian
doctrines which have been advanced concerning procreative obligations.
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selected groups such as "u !erdeveloped" societies, poor >mmunities, etc. Most of thes( >roposals and the supporting re ons
involve a teleological orien1 ion
to the production of incr sed
good, much the same as in c sslcal utilitarian theory. The r~- t or
the obligatory is defined in rms
of the maximization of thf ~d
and once the element or ele. ·nts
preventing such maximizati1 are
uncovered the moral path is ear.
Overpopulation p r e v en t . the
maximization of the good 'the
greatest happiness for the eatest number" was the ch . ical
utilitarian formulation) and ~nee
population reduction becorr , the
overriding obligation. Almm· ,mything may be and often is anctioned in its behalf by thos who
keep forecasting catastr·· Jhes.
This is utilitarian theory .;t its
boldest. To use Kierkegaar .· 's famous phrase thi s invol' ~s a
teleological suspension o! any
ethical considerations othe1 than
the pursuit of beneficience. Anything that stands in the way of
maximization of the good is either
ignored or condemned. 1
I propose to sketch an alternaLinacre Quarterly

tive that centers around a notion
see the difficulties in this arguof procreative obligations and is
ment.
based upon a fundamentally difNarveson's position, when
ferent view of moral obligation
stripped of the verbiage that inand of the relation between the
evitably accompanies philosophiright and the good. To do this I
cal work, involves the rejection of
shall use some of the central
any positive moral significance for
cosmic symbols of the Jewish and
procreation. To arrive at this
Christian religions. However, this
overall result Narveson has two
does not presuppose the necessity
essential sub-results: 1) the rejecof being a believer for this argut ion of procreative obligations visment to be persuasive. I have
a-vis t he unborn child on logical
used these symbols because I find
grounds, and 2) the rejection of
them helpful in presenting the
it vis-a-vis overall societal hapargument and in making clear the
piness on considerations arising
case being made; but I am fully
from u tilitarian theory.J
persuaded that this case can be
The first objection is fairly simmade without any explicit referple. Although it would seem cerence to Christian or Jewi sh
tain to pose serious difficulties, I
theism.
sha ll not argue it here. Narveson
As a starting point for my arguaccepts a referential theory of
ment I will present the utilitarian
meaning from Strawson and
conclusion on procreation from
Quine and proceeds to argue that
one of its boldest contemporary
statements about an unborn (or
defenders. On this basis it will
unconceived) child make no
then be clearer just where these
sense. For example, the statement
views are different and what the
"Jones will be happier when he
difficulties of the utilitarian posiis born than he is now" is logicaltion are.
ly nonsensical since " Jones" does
not refer to anyone. Narveson
In a pair of recent articles J an
tries to show that such consideraNarveson has argued vigorously
tions rule out talk about the right
for the utilitarian conclusions on
of the unborn to be boin (since
procreative i s s u e s , particularly
this involves rights without bearwith respect to those issues I am
ers) ; furthermore, he argues, this
directly concerned with - obligadoes not allow us to posit any obtions to procreate. 2 I have anumligation to procreate based on the
ber of difficulties about Narvehappiness of the child since it
son's arguments, most of which I
would always involve at the same
will not detail here since the purpoint the idea that X's happiness
pose of this article is to argue for
will be increased and this involves
a completely different approach.
precisely the nonsensical stateWhat I will do is present the basment above. 4
ics of his arguments against procreative obligations. Following
Having thus supposedly ruled
this, we shall he in a position to
out any attempt to argue that t he
February, 1975
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child's happiness or rights can be
invoked Narveson's next move is
to show that considerations of
general social happiness would
not produce these results from a
utilitarian premise. To begin with
Narveson seems to dismiss those
views that focus their attention
on total social happiness. Such
positions as this can be very hard
on minorities. For example, suppose we could increase total social happiness a hundredfold with
certain forms of slavery. Total
happiness arguments do not give
one very much support for countering such a venture; it can be
argued persuasively that they
provide no reason at all to protest
such a program.s
Furthermore, Narveson argues
against the notion that the particular happiness of the members
of the society will be directly increased. Adding new people to
the society, even if these newcomers are happy, will not add
anything to the happiness of the
members already there. If there
is a society of 100 members each
with X happiness, then adding
another 100 people will not logically increase the individual happiness from X to X-plus-1 or
something greater.6 The only
possible alternative would be a
"total happiness" or "lump sum"
view that, as we just saw, has a
number of serious difficulties attached to it. Thus Narveson
draws this conclusion: "the argument that an increase in general
happiness will result from our
having a happy child involves
. precisely the same fallacy as he
40

had just given in an exampl
you ask 'whose happiness
been increased as a result o
having been born?' the ans.,.;
that nobody's has. Of courst
being born might have inc
effects on the general happ.
but that is quite another m<
The general populace is ju
happy as it was before.'' 7

If

tas
1is
is
'1IS

'!ct
ess
er.
as

'Indirect Benefits' Citer
Narveson is willing to r ertain th.e notion that some S} 10ff
benefits (he calls them inl ect
benefitS) may come fron increased population. Some ! nefits that he lists are indus 1alization and its . attendant
cial
advancement which he says nay
increase social happiness. !\ -veson does not really develor this
argument very far, and for ood
reason. This argument abot indirect benefits does not Sef •1 to
get away from t he difficult ·s of
total happiness views, or if t is
meant to, Narveson neve explains how.
Finally, Narveson is um•. lling
to posit any independent 1 wral
value to the existence of h e itself. To do so would involve his
teleological system in diffic·•lt ies
that he is trying to avoid: For
him to stress the intrinsic goodness of life would on the face of
it force him to argue for continued u n 1i mite d procreat ion
since his utilitarian theory posits
obligation in terms of the maximization of the good. This is precisely what Narveson is t rying to
avoid in his essays. An admission
that life itself is an intrinsic good
Linacre Quarterly

would open up the argument all
over again.
The result of his discussion is
that he cannot find any positive
moral obligation that could lead
one to procreate: " Is it ever one's
duty to have children? I can
think of only one case where it
night. If it can be shown that the
populace will suffer if its size is
not increased then it seems to me
that one could perhaps require
efforts in that direction and punish those who could comply but
do not. But I am inclined to
think that such a situation is exceedingly rare.''8 There are a
number of difficulties with this
conclusion, particularly in light
of Narveson's earlier arguments,
that I cannot discuss here. Particularly crucial are the difficulties with minorities that were
pointed to earlier, a difficulty
that is explicitly opened up here.
What I am concerned with is t hat
Narveson's utilitarian ethics does
not give any positive moral significance to the procreation and
nurture of new life. This will be
the focus of our discussion.
Narveson , and those who think
as he does in the discussion of
population problems, opera t e s
with the view that the only moral
obligations that anyone has are
teleologically oriented duties to
Produce future benefits. The only
relation in which we stand to others is that of benefactor to benefited. The duty to increase the
happiness of others is our only
duty (Narveson is never clear
about duties to oneself). Since
February, 1975

talk of increasing the happiness
of the unborn child is meaningless to him and since it is very
problematic to argue for the increased happiness of the society
except in a morally dangerous
way, procreation is not an obligation that one could have; it is reduced simply to a matter of taste
or personal enjoyment much like
eating candy or going to the
movies. 9 It is my contention that
this line of reasoning, which
focuses only on future benefits,
is widespread in the current literature on t he "population problem" and in programs to prevent
population growth. Furthermore,
I think that it displays a somewhat unsophisticated analysis of
the nature of moral obligation
and the various obligations that
each of us is confronted with. In
the remainder of this essay I
want to suggest an alternative
view t hat is beter equipped than
Narveson's to handle these issues.
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An Alternative View

One of t he central affirmations
of the Jewish and Christian traditions is that life is a gift. In a
recent important paper, Talcott
Parsons has written, " In the
Judeo-Christian tradition andespecially in the Christian phase
life for the individual is defined
in the first instance as a gift.'' 10
The first act of God as recorded
in the Bible is that of creation; a
free act unmerited by anything
that His creatures may have done
previously. The creation of man
is seen as the pinnacle of this creation; to him is giveri the gift of

,•

I•, '

life in a most profound sense. Human life is the greatest gift of
God. Furthermore God is presented as centrally concerned
with the creation of those social
and communal supports of human
life that are basic to its preservation. As Parsons and his collaborators have noted, God creates
both the biological life of man
and the sociological life of man,
the community of Israel. In both
of these cases the basic elements
necessary for the continuation of
life on this planet are seen essentially as gifts given to man which
he never earned and never was
given as a reward .
That each of us exists at all as
independent selves is not any of
our own doing. Our lives are in a
very real sense not our own; we did
not purchase them or demand
that they be given to us as rewards or medals. Our lives are the
result of the gifts of others: parents who gave us birth and who
nurtured us when we were young;
teachers, friends, associates who
have all nurtured and sustained
us. An interconnected network of
persons, institutions and cultural
systems that make up our society
has brought each of us into being
and continues to nourish and support our lives. Without this massive bio-social matrix none of us
would eXist. This overarching biosocial organism has made life possible for us and for the millions
who have gone before. In a rich
and suggestive passage, the great
English political theorist Edmund
Burke provides a superb picture
of this bio-social matrix that nur42

:e:

tures and sustains human

Society is indeed a contra< Subordinate contracts for obJ ..s of
m e re cccasional interest r y be
dissolved at pleasure - I
the
state ought not to be consilf d as
nothing better than a part rship
agreement in ·a trade of pep r and
coffee, calico or tobacco c some
other s uch low concern, to I aken
up for a little temporary
erest
and to be dissolved by th fancy
of the parties. It is to b( •oked
upon with other reverence:
::ause
it is not a partne rship i1 hings
s ubservient only to the gr•
am·
mal existence of a tempor 1 and
pe rishabl e nature.
It is a partnership in all
ience;
a partnership in all art; a • rt ner·
s hip in every virtue a nd in I per·
fection. As the ends of such part·
nership can not be obtained
many
generations it becomes a 1 rtner·
s hip not only between th·
who
a re living but be tween th
who
are dead and those who a
to be
born.
Each contract of each p · icula r
state is but a clause in tl great
primeval contract of e te r l l so·
ciety, linking the lower v h the
highe r natures, connecting e visi ·
ble w ith the invisible worl rl ccord·
ing to a fixed compact s11 tioned
holds
by the inviolable oath wh r
all physical and a ll mora l ,a tures
each in their appointed p ·e. rr

The Bio-Social Mat!
Society is not simply a r a tomistic collection of individm. · each
relating to one another a ~ benefactors and benefited. I t is an
elaborate matrix of socic; l, cultural and biological elemen ts that
has given each of us the gift of
life, for which we owe the most
profound debt of gratitude. If life
is seen as a gift then each of us
are debtors with respect to the
bio-social matrix that has given

"
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that life. The result of this view
positive harm to individuals may
is that we stand in a relation to
result but in the process he althis societal matrix that Narvelowed for a dubious outcome in
son and those who think as he
relation to minorities.
does are unable to take account
Narveson and those who think
of adequately. Classical utilitaras
he does are thus unable to see
ian theory of Narveson's variety
the
profound debt of gratitude
is only able to see morally signifithat
the gift of life creates for
cant relations to those whom one
all
those
who have received it. It
may benefit. Obligations then
is
my
contention
that a closer exarise out of a possible future beof
the
many morally
amination
.otowal of benefits to others. In
relations
that impinge
significant
this scheme a morally significant
will reveal
on
persons
in
society
relation, or further, a definite oba
far
greater
range
of
such relaligation cannot arise out of a sitthan
simply
that
of benetions
uation of a gift or a debt. These
factor
to
beneficiaries.
Persons
are oblig~tions that have no parstand
in
many
relationships
to
ticular reference to any future
each
other
debtor
to
creditor,
benefits which may accrue from
promiser to promisee, etc.-which
the fulfillment of them. These obsimply cannot be understood in
ligations stress the continuity of
the
framework of utilitarianism.
Present not only with the future
It
is
this inability to deal adebut with the past. But in the
quately
with a number of prima
utilitarian framework in which
facie
duties
that is the center of
Narveson operates, obligations
our
difficulty
with Narveson and .
arising out of gifts that one has
other
utilitarian
population theorbeen given in the past are simply
12
Lacking
this perspective,
ists.
not accounted for.
utilitarians can find no independIn this way Narveson and
ent basis for any obligation to
those who think as he does cannot
repay the debt of gratitude creaaccount for one's relation to the
ted by the gift of life. Past actions
bio-social matrix that has nourof others or ourselves can never
ished him as morally significant
create moral obligations; only the
except insofar as one may benefit
possible production of future good
it in the future by reducing popcan do that. An excellent example
ulation. The good has been deof this line of thought is from Dr.
termined as t h e reduction of
Edgar Chasteen, a sociologist who
population and obligations simply
is on the Board of Zero Populafollow along. The overriding contion Growth:
cern for the maximization of the
good does not allow any other
W e live in a finite world. Whatever
the number of people it is capable
conflicting obligations to temper
of s upporting there is a limit. We
t~e pursuit of supposed benedo know that our world is doing a
ficence. Narveson, as we saw, alpretty poor job of supporting its
allowed some exceptions where
present population of a round 31J2
February, 1975
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billion. How long can we ex pect to
doubl e world p opulation every 35
years? To what end? In what ways
will we be better off with 7 billion
people than with 31h billion ? What
possible advantages are there in
even minima l growth? Scores of
disadvantages come r eadily to mind
but not a single benefit. The s tork
is not the bird of paradise. 13

Aside from the dubious factual
assumptions and perhaps errors
made by this author, this is pure
utilitarianism at its boldest. The
calculus of benefits and harms is
the measuring rod of all moral
obligations. Once the proper calculations have been made, which
Chasteen thinks are obvious, population growth limitation can be
endorsed with full vigor.
'Duties of Gratitude'
But this position is unable to
see other sources of moral obligation in human life. One of these
that has been separated and
analyzed by certain moral philosophers ar~ duties that arise
out of previous services that have
been rendered to us. Gifts or services t hat have been rendered to
us create what W. D. Ross has
called " Duties of Gratitude." 14
For example, suppose my neighbor saved my child's life by pulling him out of the path of an oncoming car. My gratitude for that
act inay make it morally incumbent on me to spend time helping
him repair his house, during
which time I otherwise would be
playing tennis or maybe helping
someone else toward whom I had
no particular debt of gratitude.
These duties of gratitude are
neither obscure nor complicated.

44

In fact the obligation to n ~ive
gifts and, more significant} to
repay gifts is very widely 1 :ognized in less advanced cult t ~. 1.;
It was, for example, basic t the
moral thought of the Old 'J stament and its ·· emphasis q ; the
covenant. 16 Furthermore
1ese
obligations , are not equ. able
with any generalized obligat n to
do good. They are indepe :lent
right-making characteristi
of
action that enable us, for mmple, to see the obligation to 3pay
a de.b t as more binding t m a
general duty to help othe1 For
example, suppose someon had
ten dollars to give away tc ither
of two friends, A or B, bt that
he had promised the mone to A.
It makes a great deal mon noral
sense to say that one's obl ation
is to give the money to
than
it would to say that it ,esn't
matter at all since the be fit of
the outcome would be eqt. ' • i.e.,
someone will have ten do• rs he
did not have. This last 1 sition
is where Chasteen's unva ished
focus on benefits and ·1orms
would leave us. More sigro icantly, suppose one had a te vision
set to give away and everal
neighbors to consider as recipients. But suppose that nne of
them had just saved y0ur life.
Chasteen's ( and Nan 0son's)
utilitarianism would find no special sense of moral obligation to
give the gift to t he neigh bor who
saved your life. All neighbors are
in the same relationship to you;
they are possible recipients of
your benefit. One might as well
Linacre Quarterly
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draw lots f.or the gift. Unless we
can see a range of obligations a
good deal more complex than
that, we are unable to account
for the sense of obligation felt by
a great many to give the gift to
the neighbor who saved one's life.
Without this we will simply miss
a good many of the moral obligations sensed, encountered and
fulfilled in common huma~ experience.

obligations of gratitude are fulfilled and human life is sustained
on t h i s planet. Without the
morally judicious use of t hese
powers the bio-social matrix that
nurtures and sustains human life
would cease to exist.18 The sense
of gratitude for the gift of life is
a powerful source of obligation to
sustain the bio-social organism
that makes human life possible at
all.

This analysis of independent
prima facie obligations that arise
out of past gifts and services enables us to see the place of procreation and the gift of life in our
moral lives. Narveson was unable
to see the independent moral significance of procreation because
he could not see an obligation
that was not specifically linked
to future benefits. By seeing a
source of duty independently
arising out of past gifts we can
argue, in a way that Narveson
was unable to, for the prima facie
obligation to procreate. Furthermore we do not need to involve
o~rselves in the logical complications which Narveson suggests
surround any attempt to speak
of the unborn in these contextsY

The Procreative Act:
Sustaining Human Life

The life that each of us has as
independent selves is the most
PI'Ofound and meaningful gift that
· each of us has been given. Without it all else would be useless.
The procreative powers of ~an
are not just another pleasure prod u c i n g biological mechanism.
;r'hey are the deeply personal way
1b which this gift of life is repaid.
They are the way in which our
February, 1975
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The procreative act is basic to
the maintenance of human life
and community; the "order of
creation," to use a t heological
phrase, could not be sustained
without it. 19 The obligation to
procreate is thus neither obscure
nor fundamentally mistaken. In
the procreative act men affirm
t heir willingness to sustain human life on t his planet. They bear
witness to the goodness of human
life and the matrix that makes it
possible. In the procreative act
men profoundly commit t hemselves to the future of the human
community in general and ·of the
society in which they live. zo They
have become, as Burke put it, "a
clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society." The
great religious traditions of the
west have said that procreation
is sacred. By this they have expressed their recognition of the
irreducible moral significance of
the procreative act. Narveson's
failure to see any deeper significance to procreation than the
pleasure some people derive from
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young children attests. ~o t~e f~il
ure of his brand of utlbtariamsm
to explain adequately the moral
significance of the procreative
act.
P erhaps the most immediate
objection to this view is that it
contains no check on the procreation of unlimited numbers and
surely such a position is wrong.
Two points, however, strongl_y
mitigate this objection. Fi_rst, It
must be insisted that t his has
only established the prima faci e
obligation of procreation. It has
not and by its nature could not
have argued for the actual duty
of procreation in every single
case.zt For example, a couple who
has already had two or three ch_ildren may find that the commitments they have made to those
children preclude any other commitments to new children because
these new commitments could not
be fulfilled in a satisfactory manner. In another case, a soldier. in
a just war may find that his pnor
moral commitments preclude having any offspring at all. Thus i~
important ways the prima facze
nature of the case made here does
not necessarily mean that ev~ry
one will have unlimited offsprmg.
Secondly, one must keep in
mi~d what was said earlier about
the crealion of new life. The creation of viable new life occu~s
in a bio-social matrix. Certam
pro-natalist arguments h~ve forgotten this and end up m great
difficulty by advocating continued biological reproduction at
an unhindered rate while neglecting the social m a t r i x that is

46

equally important for tht
creation of viable new life.
prepared to argue that if H
cial matrix is seen as an
part of t he procreation pl
then a theory of procreativ
gations will not lead to unl
population ,i ncrease but _c
quire precisely the opposii

proam
; soqual
cess,
oblitited
1 re-

Procreative obligations stem
from the obligation to r rture
and support human life a a repayment for the gift of li that
each ·of us has been giver Thus
one has obligations towa. :5 the
bio-social matrix that crea ~ new
life. In this fashion ont could
very easily support famil planning programs whose pm _,se is
to maintain and foster viable
family units and socio- ~ ltural
units whose stable pres ce is
necessary to the procref on of
new life. Wh a t ever the ,recise
nature or dimensions of t .:! population problem, a subjer which
is open to wide dispute, t does
seem likely that some ·rm of
population limitation mu~ be encouraged in the decade" ahead.
From the moral perspect . ve outlined in this essay such P· ograms
could be supported in~ far . as
vastly in c rea sed po ulatJ?n
threatens the viability oi the bw·
social matrix to which o te owes
such a profound debt of grat itude
for the gift of life. For example, 8
great deal is coming to be k~o'~
about the necessity for emotwn f
support in the development 0
· 11 for
Young children and especJa Y
·
the development of loVIng con·
cern for others. 22 A family thus
might find it morally obligatorY
Linacre QuarterlY

to limit its offspring rather severely in order t o maintain a high
level of emotional support for already present children as a prerequisite for their growth into
morally sensitive adults. In this
way, the argument that I have
sketched above does not pose any
obstacles to family planning programs that are acceptable on other grounds, both moral and factual. It would, however, have a
real effect en the acceptability of
certain specific proposals and on
the way in which the problem is
stated and debated in the p u blic
arena. Lef us consider some of
these impacts in the last section.
Moral argument in the social
arena concerns not only the particular proposal being supported
but the method of argumentation
that is being used to marshall the
populace on its behalf. This is because a pattern of thinking about
moral issues that blots out significant elements of the moral
calculus in support of noble ends
can easily be transferred to less
noble goals where the inability to
see the full range of moral elements may be harmful or worse.
The position advanced above
calls into question the kind of
reasoning so obviously manifest
in the quotation above from
Chasteen and which could be
. echoed by reams of other quotations from the literature on the
"population problem." By failing
to take account of obligations
other than the obligation to produce benefits one can easily move
to less than desira ble means of
Population limitation. For examFebruary, 1975

ple, schemes for forcible sterilization of certain target groups become legitimated because the
positive moral significance of procreation is not taken account of
by those who see population
limitation as the way to the
maximization of the good. The
argument advanced above will
call int9 question certain specific
proposals advanced on behalf of
population limitation. As an example let us examine one such
proposal. 23
Hardin's Proposal
In a recent publication Garret
Hardin advances a n interesting
proposal for changing public attitudes toward marriage and procreation. In order to avoid misrepresenting him I shall let him
speak for himself:
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Another useful step we might take
is to start putting n ew ideas into
the heads of young people especia lly young girls. By young I mean
first. second and t hird graders. W e
need to teach them that it is not
necessary for them to become mom mies when they grow up, and that
if they do become mommi es they
need to introduce into the Dick and
Jane readers some c haracters othe r
than Jane's mommy a nd daddy
a nd the couple n ext door whose
children are named Carol and Jac k
and Tom, and the neighbors across
the street with their three or four
childre n. P e rhaps we need to know
Dick a nd Jane's Aunt Debbie, a
swinging single of 40, who's as pre tty as a picture. Now we don 't have
to tell these first grade rs what kind
of fine time s he is having. They
need only to see he r with a smile
on her face, see that she likes children and is comfortable with them.
Aunt Debbie isn't a sour old maid
who hates kids. She loves young-
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sters but doesn't want them around
her all the time; it's e n ough for
h er to visit her nieces and n e phews.
And when she isn't vis iting them .
sh e lives a different kind of life and it's a good life.
There are too many n ow who
marry because they think they
have to. Some of these p eople in
their heart of hearts don 't want to
have children, but they cannot resist the social pressure. S o it is important to get into the s chools the
notion that there are alternative
goals to marriage and parenthood.
If we can get this message across
we not only can diminish the birth
rate but we can diminish also a
great deal of heartach e ; because
semi -re luctant pa rents statistically
speaking t e n d to become only
grudgingly reconciled parents. We
want to make it possible for them
to live a good life, res pected by the
community, that does n o t involve
having children. While su ch education does not coerce the children,
we may have to coerce the educators. We may have some serious
battles ahead when we introduce
Aunt Debbie into the first grade
reader fo~ the first time, but I
think we've got to face this. I think
we can win this battle.24

To begin with, there are some
entirely praiseworthy aspects to
this proposaL The legitimation of
smaller families is sound and perhaps desirable. It is also undoubtedly true that many may feel
overly guilty for remaining single;
perhaps some early examples may
help to lessen the guilt and the
anxiety. But I am concerned here
with the deeper implications of
Hardin's proposaL What this proposal implies is that there is nothing morally different between
procreation and parenthood, and
singleness. So long as Aunt ·Deb-
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hie is happy it's just fine. I
admits that many people c
compelled to procreate and
tain families but he can set
ing more significant in thi
social pressure. He seems
unable or unwilling to rec
that the obligation to pr1
felt by mariy can be grour
a moral perspective that
tirely laudable and a go<
more substantial than m
cial pressure.

rdin
feel
tamoththan
o be
,ize
·eate
:!d in
, endeal
a so-

What this proposal o' looks
is the idea that procreatJ ' and
singlehood are not nee . ;arily
morally equal. Under t
proposal as he h~s presented there
does not seem to be an) aason
to avoid simply drawing >ts to
determine whether to bc. Jme a
parent or remain single. dmittedly there may be laud[' e reasons for remaining sin~
But
Hardin parlays reasons t ' t may
be good in some situati1 s into
a general theory, and
!re he
proves too much. In th~ earlier
sections of this essay I a ued at
some length the difficl ies of
utilitarian moral theory , he argument does not need r• ea~in?·
What Hardin's proposal l tta1ls IS
precisely the kind of posi on that
Narveson took; there ·.u e no
moral reasons independe t of the
production of happiness ' r pleasure that could lead on<. to procreate. We saw the diffit .tlties of
this position earlier. 25
But suppose Hardin's proposal
was adopted somewhere. A young
person confronted with two attractively presented role models
Linacre QuarterlY

asks how he is to choose the pata re prima facie obligations for
tern of his life. What criteria is
procreation that cannot be equathe to use, what morally sensitive
ed with Aunt Debbie's utiliguidance is he to receive? Hardtarianism. In order to handle the
in's proposal seems to say to him
difficulties I h a v e suggested,
that he is to follow his desire, or
Hardin could modify his proposal.
"seek your greatest happiness."
One fruitful approach might be to
But under his own ground rules
have Aunt Debbie engaged in
Hardin could not object if everysome occupation that precludes,
one chose not to procreate as the
on morally laudatory grounds,
way to enhance their own happiher having a family. For example,
ness. The nurture of the young
Aunt Debbie could be a military
is not an easy task; often it takes
officer manning vital defense ingreat personal sacrifice - physist allations, who comes to visit
cal, emotional, and material. Paronce in awhile. She could tell the
ents sometimes die for their chilchildren at home about her exdren, or forego great material
citing work and how important
goods on behalf of their offspring.
it is, etc. Grade school readers are
But under Hardin's proposal
not text books on moral phiAunt Debbie would be wiser than
losophy; but if the worthwhile
any of these: she would be folgoal of suggesting other alternalowing her own desires, seeking
tives than marriages and large
her own happiness. It does not
families is to be pursued it should
seem very difficult to see how
be done with a great deal more
Hardin's Aunt Debbie and her
sensitivity to the ethical issues
ethical theory would be a great
involved than simply showing
deal more appealing to the young
Aunt Debbie as a happy person.
who are only in the process of deWhat my suggestion does is to
veloping their moral sensitivities
add some specifics that qualify
beyond a concern for self. At a
Aunt Debbie's singleness. They
critical period in the life of the
give her some morally supportyoung, Hardin seems to want to
able reasons for being sit:tgle that
inculcate them with a rather indo not undermine the growing
adequate moral theory.
moral sensitivity of the young.
They provide an example that
Sensitivity to Ethical Issues
could
be useful in later moral edIf the argument presented in
ucation
and in the development
the first sections of this essay is
of
those
moral sensitivities which
correct then the moral perspecmust be included in any serious
tive of Hardin's proposal is quite
moral theory : sensitivities which
unsatisfactory. As I suggested becast a great deal of doubt on the
fore, however, there are excellent
elements in Hardin's proposal.
kind of utilitarianism seemingly
What Hardin's ideas lack is some
advocated by Aunt Debbie and
sensitivity to the idea that there
through her, Hardin himself.
February, 1975
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Conclusion
The moral issues surrounding
the procreation of new life are
many and complex. One essay
cannot hope to mention all of the
problems. Questions of distributive justice, of individual rights,
of social welfare all impinge on
the procreative process and upon
what has been various termed
"the population problem." This
essay has attempted the modest
task of suggesting a morally sensitive alternative to certain views
of the procreative process that
seem to be widely held in certain
circles. I have been concerned
here to argue that there are profound sources of the obligation to
procreate that are being overlooked by those discussions of
the population problem that follow the foundations of teleological-utilitarian ethics.
If the argument advanced here

is fundamentally sound, then a
fresh look at state control or
coercion in the procreation process as advocated by many will
be necessary. Moreover a more
sophisticated and sensitive discussion of the decisions of individuals to procreate or not to procreate will also be a result of
moving the discussion out of the
utilitarian arena. To these ends
this essay is only the first step. It
is hoped that more serious work
will follow.
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I am raising.

4. I have serious reservations about
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the future state of being of the newborn. But if this is the case, then given
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the present and future s tate of the
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may bring many be nefits of increased
educational opportunity, increa sed
health care, etc., that benefit a ll the
members of a society. If this is the
case then it may be possible, on utilitarian grounds, to make some case fo r
Procreative obligations. But I think
that Narveson is right in seeing tha t
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taken in r egard to utili taria n theory
renerally; h e simply may not have

February, 1975

8. " Utilitarianism and N ew G e n e ra tions," op. cit., p . 72.

9. In his second essay, Narveson
explicitly draws this a nalogy. S ee
Narveson, " Moral Problems of P opulation," p. 74.
10. Parsons, Talcott; R enee Fox and
Victor Lidz, "The Gift of Life and
its Reciprocation ," Social A ction
(Fall, 1972) , pp. 367-415.
11. Burke, Edmund, R eflections on
the R evolution in France (New Y ork :
The Liberal Arts Press, 1955), P . 110.
It should be noted tha t classical utilitaria nism would not have had very
much sympathy with this idea of an
organic bio-social matrix. The individ ualist pre-suppositio n in which society
is seen as simply a collection of isolated individuals is central in the
utilitarian scheme. Cf. J eremy Bentham, Introduction to th e Principles
of Morals and Legislation (New Y o rk:
H afner Press, 1948) , p . 3 ff. Also see
the s uperb discu ssion of t his issue in
J acques Maritain, Th e Person and
the Common Good (New Y o rk :
Charles Scribners Sons, 1947) .

12. The notion of prima fa cie duties
is taken from W . D . R oss, The Right
and the Good (L ondo n : Oxford U ni-

51

..

-·

• ; '1.

f

. · ..

i .. •'

·· ,.:.:

.
•

J l

I ':

I

.':• •
I

I~

o

,•

I

. •.,,,....
: . : ·:

" ' ':

0

.,

••

'

•'"

I

I

I

...' I

'.·

..
.,.
.;• .:0
,

,.

··.···
•

0

•

1'
.. .'. , ..

,. .. .
•'

'w '

versity Press, 1930) , pp. 16-47. What
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one's children.
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17. I have already suggest
surthere are severe difficulties wh
is isround Narveson's analysis on
su e difficulties that Narves01 eems
to 'be aware of. It is impor 1t to
r ealize, however , that t h e anal• , pre·
refsented h e re d ~ not e ntail ;
e re nces of the kind that t\ veson
thinks are meaningless. Even 1 a rve·
uture
son's analysis of refer ences t
p e rsons is entirely correct tl a rgu·
m ent presented here could ), main·
tained with very little modifi w n.
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n o moral point to e xistenC<• " such.
would
In order to argue that life it s
n ot cease unde r h is sch em• N arveson was forced to argue th~ having
children is s imply pleasurt ble for
many people, like playing g· 1es, and
h ence many p eople would ' ill have
children even if no moral vatue could
be found for it. This seem s a go_od
deal like throwing out the h:.~by with
the bath water in order to p reserve a
weak ·a rgument.
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creation" is fundame ntally sound at
this point. His discussion of marriage
and procreation a s one of the basic
elements (he calls them m andates)
of the "order of creation" is a n impor tant insight on the vital link between
human procreation and the sustenance
of the created world of man as a gift
from God. Cf. Die trich B onhoeffer .
Ethics (Eberhard Bethge, ed .; tr. by
Neville Smith, New York: Macmman.
1967), pp. 207-213, 173-183.
20. On this point of relation with
the future there is some sound a na lysis in Arthur J . Dyck, "Population
Policy and Ethical A cceptability,"
Callahan op. cit., pp. 351-377, and
Arthur J. Dyck, " Procreative Righ ts
and Population P olicy." Hastings
Center Stuiiies 1:1.

21. The distinction be tween actual
and prima facie duties (footnote 12)
is important at this point.
22. On this, see Darwin L . Thom as.
"Family Size and Childre n 's Cha r acteristics," in Bahr, Thomas, Chadwick (eds.), op. cit., pp. 137-157. Also
the excellent work by J ohn Bowlby.
Child Care and the Growth of Love.
23. It should be recognized that
many of these proposals can be
analyzed in the framework of procrea-

25. Hardin's u tilitarian mora l theory
is evident throughout the essay and
in his other work. His inability to see
any independent moral significance
to procreation is seen in his willingness to sanction almost anything on
behalf of population limitation . H e
t hinks t hat a bortion s hould be used
as a backstop wh e n othe r methods
fail to e lim inate unwanted birth , a nd
he is even willing to sanction "i nvoluntary m e thods" if present voluntarism fails. For more information on
H a rdin's views see his book B irth
Control (New York: P egasus. 1970) .

Almighty God, Creator and Give r of
life. thro ugh the merits of Thine only
begotte n S on J esus, and His Immac ulate M other Mary. grant a safe
delivery to this mothe r a nd her infant.

0 Holy Spirit! Give me good judgement and direct my hands in the performance of this task. May this child
be reared to know. love and serve Thee
and the reby gain e verlas ting life.
Amen.
Mothe r of Mothers, pray for us.

(Printed copies available from W. F.
Preston, M.D., 2222 W . 17th St., Wilmington, Delaware 19806.)
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is different and as a conseque nce I
have selected a proposal for analysis
which is not as readily and analyzable
in terms of rights but one which would
seem to me to be questionable as presently formulated, when considered in
light of the a rgument advanced in this
essay.

24. Hardin, Garrett, " Multiple
Paths to Population Control," Callahan, op. cit., pp. 264-265. This essay
appeared origi nally in Family Plan ning Perspectives, Vol. 2 :3 (June.
1970).
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op. cit., has done this. My argument
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19. Bonhoeffer's analysis of the manf
dates which are part of the "'order 0
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tive rights that couples h ave vis-a -vis
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